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Abstract
A curious ownership structure is found in Northern Europe – foundations that own
and operate business companies. The foundations are non-profit entities, they have no
members and no owners, and they cannot be dissolved, but regard it as a goal in itself
to run a business. In many cases these entities control more than 50% of the votes in
successful international companies such as Carlsberg and IKEA. Obviously this
structure completely blocks the market for corporate control, but it also violates other
basic principles of agency theory and corporate finance: the personal profit motive
and portfolio diversification of risk. Nevertheless we present evidence that a sample
of foundation-owned companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange are at least
as efficient as other listed companies in terms of risk adjusted stock returns,
accounting returns and firm value (Tobin’s Q). These findings have potentially
important implications for the theory of the firm, in particular they question whether
profit-seeking ownership is a necessary condition for competitive enterprise.  They
also invite caution against forcing a harmonization of European corporate governance
to Anglo-American standards.
                                                
1 We are grateful for helpful comments by Niels Christian Nielsen and participants at a seminar at the
Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, March 6, 2002. 
2 Professor. Department of International Economics and Management. Copenhagen Business School,
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3 Assistant professor. Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, 5A,
2000 Copenhagen F, Denmark. E-mail cr.fi@cbs.dk.
21. Introduction
Does corporate ownership matter? Do companies need owners? 50 years ago many
economists would probably have said no.
As anecdotal evidence consider Debreu  (1959), who wrote that “.. when one
abstracts from legal forms of organisation (corporations, sole proprietorships,
partnerships,…) one obtains the concept of a producer, i.e. an economic agent whose
role is to choose (and carry out) a production plan” (p. 37) and “ Given the price
system.. the producer chooses his production.. so as to maximize his profit” . (p. 43).
Or recall Lange (1938) who imagined that socialist companies could be managed by
public officials who were simply ordered to minimize social costs by taking prices as
given and paying due attention to externalities (equilibrium being determined by a
planning board or by a trial and error process) thereby guaranteeing a Pareto-optimal
social outcome. Lange recognized that government bureaucrats might not be as
efficient as private sector managers (p. 109) but argued that this was a sociological
rather than an economic question and that large capitalist enterprises were anyhow run
by bureaucrats (who presumably do not maximize profits).
Since then an enormous body of literature has emerged which emphasizes that
ownership and incentives play a key role in the efficient operation of business
companies (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976, Putterman 1993, Hart 1995, Hansmann
1996, Williamson 1996, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Company performance may
benefit, if company managers own a share of the company (Jensen and Meckling
1976), or if they are monitored by large outside owners (Shleifer and Vishny 1976) or
3members of a cooperative (Hansmann 1988). For widely diffused ownership there is
always a threat of hostile takeovers (Manne 1965) or proxy contests as well as
lawsuits (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Even government-owned companies are to some
extent monitored by the bureaucracy, the politicians and ultimately the voters
(Putterman 1993). A possible exception is non-profit organizations, which are clearly
not monitored by owners, but rather by donors or users (Hansmann 1980, Fama and
Jensen 1983). But a non-profit organization is generally believed to be competitive
only in certain industries (hospitals, universities, charities and the like) and not (in the
absence of tax subsidies) to be a viable business model for commercial enterprises in
general (Fama and Jensen 1983).
The implication is that non-profit entities – companies without owners – should be a
rare phenomenon outside these special industries, and if they exist, their performance
– in terms of profitability, growth, cost efficiency or other measures - would be
expected to be abysmal. Non-profit enterprises lack a personal profit motive to
monitor managers, and their ability to attract capital from outside investors is also
limited.
Contrary to this widely held belief, we present evidence that a particular type of non-
profit organization, the industrial foundation, is a viable business organization and
also a competitive one. This is shown to hold true even when performance is
measured by stock-market-based performance measures. Moreover, we also review
the literature on non-profit enterprise and ownership and show that our findings are
less paradoxical than they might seem at first glance.
4An industrial foundation is an organization created to administer a large ownership
stake in a particular company, very often donated by the company’s founder or his
family. The foundation itself is a non-profit entity. It has no owners. Its board of
directors is often self-elective, constrained only by the law and its charter which
generally stipulates that the foundation should serve some broadly defined social
purpose, e.g. to act in the company’s “best interest” and use excess revenue for
charitable purposes.  Often, but not always, the founder’s family continues to play a
role in the management of the company. The institutional set up resembles what
would have been the case if the Ford foundation maintained majority control of Ford
Motor Company.
Foundation-ownership is found mainly in Northern Europe – Denmark, Germany,
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Examples include
world-class companies like Ikea from Sweden, Carlsberg from Denmark or Krupp,
Carl Zeis and Robert Bosch from Germany.
Previous studies on Danish data over the period 1982-1992 (Thomsen 1996, 1999)
and a study on German data (Herrmann and Franke 2002) found that the economic
performance of foundation owned companies to be no worse or even slightly better
than that of companies with more common ownership structures. However, these
studies relied on accounting-based performance measures such as return on equity
which are subject to various measurement problems including manipulation by
managers and boards that are obviously not un-biased in the view of the corporation
which they want to present to the outside world.
5This study, while also presenting some calculations on updated accounting figures,
takes a more extensive approach by examining how market-based performance
measures like risk-adjusted stock returns and firm value (Tobin’s Q) are influenced by
foundation ownership over the 4-year period 1996-1999.
The paper is conventionally structured. Section 2 reviews some relevant theory, both
some standard agency theory and alternative perspectives related to ownership
structure, non-profit enterprise and corporate objectives. In addition we consider some
reasons why these models may not predict a causal relationship between foundation
ownership and economic performance (profitability). Section 3 explains the
institutional context, which the empirical analysis relies on. Section 4 presents the
data and methodology. Section 5 presents the results, using both market and
accounting-based performance measures.  The implications are discussed in section 6.
We conclude that the relationship between corporate ownership and performance is
more complex than what is predicted by standard agency theory. This has potentially
important implications both for the economic theory of the firm and current policy
initiatives to adjust  European corporate governance to Anglo-American standards.
2. Theory
Could a business firm exist without owners? Theoretically, one could think of a self-
governing entity with an endowment, a commercial non-profit that buys factor
services and sells products on market terms and accumulates the profits. Investment
could be financed by these retained earnings or by loans. Or, similarly, a charitable
foundation could own shares in a single company instead of a portfolio of stocks and
6bonds – as was the case with Welcome foundation before it sold its business activities
to Glaxo. It turns out that the market economies of Northern Europe have in fact
provided us with several examples of this, natural experiments that seem interesting to
the study of corporate ownership structure. The traditional story is that a founder of a
company donates his shares to a charitable foundation in the understanding that the
company should continue to operate in his spirit (we know of no examples of female
founders). The foundation is run by a board. It receives dividends from its shares and
invest these earnings in financial assets or it distributes part of the revenue for charity
as stipulated in the charter, which is in fact the constitution.  In the absence of a better
word these have been termed “industrial foundations”.
It is possible to think of this question in even more abstract terms. Imagine a central
planner who wants to create a market economy without capitalism, i.e. without
outside ownership of firms. This central planer could nationalize business firms and
donate the shares to foundations. The foundations could then supervise the
companies. Apparently, this model of socialism was actually suggested in Eastern
Germany after the second world war because of the example set by Carl Zeiss, a
famous German optical firms, which was owned by a foundation.
Could such a scheme work? Standard agency theory has quite clear predictions on this
issue (Fama and Jensen 1983 p. 344, p. 348).  Non-profit enterprise is essentially a
solution to donor agency problems (preventing owners from expropriating donations
as profits). When the supply of donations is zero non-profit enterprise is unlikely to
survive in the absence of tax exemption advantages. Industrial foundations cannot
attract funds from the market, and decision makers lack economic incentives to
operate efficiently.
7In contrast Hansmann (1980) sees more of a role for commercial non-profits.
Hansmann explains the survival of these institutions by a contract-failure argument:
when the buyer is uncertain about the quality of a service provided to her, a market
failure occurs since the producer has the capacity to reduce quality of the good in
ways the cannot be detected by the buyer.  To facilitate contracting under these
circumstances the supplier may organize as a non-profit enterprise, which is free of
any profit-incentive to cheat on customers.  Non-profit enterprise can therefore be
seen as a binding commitment not to maximize profits opportunistically at the
expense of buyers, and in principle the argument can be generalized to include
safeguarding all economic relationships in which a company has decisive information
advantages. Other kinds of transaction costs related to high asset specificity may in
principle also be mitigated by non-profit ownership.
Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) develop this perspective formally in an incomplete
contracts framework. Here, the problem is not asymmetric information per se, but
rather that quality or certain aspects of it are unverifiable and cannot be contracted on.
They conclude that there is scope for non-profit enterprise in sectors of the economy
where there are opportunities for severe ex post expropriation of consumers,
employees and donors.
In their model a firm has the opportunity to reduce cost at the expense of  non-
verifiable product quality to the buyer. The owner/managers of a for-profit firm will
do this as long as the marginal cost reduction exceeds the marginal expense/effort
involved (i.e. until the marginal costs of effort equals the marginal reduction in costs).
But on the assumption that the manager of a not-for-profit firm will value a marginal
8increase in profits by less than the owner-manager of a for profit firm, she will have
less of an incentive to reduce costs and lower quality. Therefore not-for-profit firms
will invest less in cost reduction that reduces non-verifiable product quality and hurts
the buyer. Quality-sensitive buyers will recognize this and prefer to deal with the not-
for-profit firm.
Given this theoretical rationale, the survival and performance of non-profit ownership
is essentially an empirical question. While unobserved and unverifiable aspects of
quality are present to some degree in all economic relationships, their importance is
likely to vary by nature of the product, the institutional environment and other
characteristics. Furthermore, possible benefits of non-profit ownership related to
limiting the profit motive have to be weighed against the disadvantages of not being
able to attract outside equity and lower cost efficiency because of less intense
monitoring (Fama and Jensen 1983).
In summary, there are two conflicting views pertaining to foundation ownership of
business enterprise. The standard agency view is that the disadvantages of a not-for-
profit structure are too large for foundation ownership to be a viable business model.
Most economists would probably a priori subscribe to this sceptical view. Another
view (drawing on Hansmann’s work and the Glaeser/Shleifer paper) is that there may
be a rationale for foundation ownership as a safeguard for non-verifiable product
quality and implicit contracts with employees or other stakeholders. According to the
standard agency view, foundation-owned companies should ceteris paribus tend to do
worse than shareholder-owned firms in terms of profitability (and perhaps also other
performance measures such as growth).
9According to the not-for-profit theory, the relative profitability and performance of
foundation-owned companies should depend on the importance of non-verifiable
quality etc.  and is a priori undecided.
Ownership and performance
These factors may seem to point to a causal relationship between non-profit
ownership and economic performance. Depending on industry- and firm specific
characteristics one would expect foundation owned companies to do slightly worse
(or more rarely slightly better) than a control group of normal joint stock firms. In this
paper we focus on performance measured in financial terms using accounting and
market based profit measures although these measures are clearly biased towards the
objectives of for-profit firms. Other performance measures like growth or survival are
clearly also relevant, but if foundation-owned can match the financial performance of
normal joint stock companies, this is a strong indication of competitiveness.
On closer examination, however, even the link between ownership and financial
performance may be more complex than a direct  causal relationship.
One reason is uncertainty concerning what it means to maximize profits. Alchian
(1950) argued that it is impossible a priori to maximize profits in an uncertain world.
Under uncertainty firms can only devise certain strategies, which they may believe to
maximize expected profits. Regardless of their motives, however, it will only ex post -
with the benefit of hindsight - become clear to what extent these strategies actually
did maximize profits (and in complex situations perhaps not even then).
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By an evolutionary argument, those firms that came close to profit maximization will
tend to survive and grow (barring the cases in which exit would have been optimal) -
still regardless of the motives that led them to adopt these strategies. Foundation-
owned companies may therefore in certain circumstances be profit-maximizing even
though they did not intend to be so a priori
A second argument is survival pressure (Friedman 1953): if profits are necessary for
company survival and the continued provision of perquisites to the management, why
don’t foundation-owned companies imitate shareholder-owned ones? And if under
certain circumstances it proves rewarding in terms of profits not to seek those profits
too eagerly, why don't for-profit firms learn to mimic non-profit-maximizing
behavior?  One guess is that they actually do so to a significant extent. In industries
where long-term thinking is thought to be well rewarded, firms will adopt long-term
strategies regardless of their ownership structure - and those that do not will tend to
lose out in competition. In the same way, foundation-owned companies may mimic
profit-maximizing companies in order to maximize survival. The Friedman argument
somewhat limits the expected effects of ownership structure on economic behaviour
and performance. This does not mean that ownership never matters, since for example
there is a difference to credibility of various types of commitment under alternative
ownership structures (e.g. the non-verifiable quality emphasized in the
Glaeser/Shleifer model). But the impact of ownership structure again turns out to
depend very much on the extent to which possible advantages related to ownership
structure can be effectively imitated by other means.
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A related line of research is Roy Radner’s exploration (Radner 1998) of the
distinction between profit-maximizing and survival-maximizing firms (particularly
since survival-maximization appears not to be a bad first-cut approximation of the
goals of foundation-owned enterprises). One important result of this research (Dutta
and Radner 1999) is that if there are both survival maximising and profit maximizing
firms in a population of firms the proportion of profit maximisers will quickly
dwindle into insignificance. Ceteris paribus profit-maximizing companies should be
more profitable, build up smaller economic reserves (equity) and fail more often.
While this it not a complete story (since e.g. entry also needs to be taken intro
account) the implication is that ceteris paribus the proportion of single-minded profit
maximizers should be small at any given moment since most of them should have
been weeded out by natural selection.
A third factor could detract even further from the importance of ownership structure.
In practice, profit maximization means that companies should undertake investment
projects whose rate of return exceeds the costs of capital. A foundation with an
endowment faces a choice between investing in the company that it owns or a
portfolio of stocks and bonds  (Fama and Jensen 1985). Now even if the foundation
board aims to maximize survival of a company that it owns, the volume of perquisites
produced by that company or some other non-profit goal, it faces a choice between
investing in the company and an alternative investment in the market for which it can
obtain a market rate of return while postponing consumption of its non-profit goods
for a given period of time. In principle the foundation would therefore choose to
invest only when the utility/profits generated by the investment exceeds the
discounted utility that could be had next period by a somewhat larger sum of money.
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In other words, even a foundation-owned company might very well end up using the
market rate of return as its costs of capital. In particular, a survival maximising board
will be able to extend the expected life-time of a loss making company (whose
marginal investments do not cover its cost of capital) by an alternative investment in a
financial portfolio.
Fourth, ownership may be an endogenous variable, which reflects optimising
behaviour by the key decision makers (Demsetz 1983). For example, foundation
boards may decide to reduce their shareholdings or sell off parts of the company (or
all of it) if they perceive that this serves goals like maximizing the expected the
company’s survival probability. This appears to have been one reason why the
Welcome foundation decided to sell its pharmaceutical to Glaxo.
Finally, there is the general scepticism concerning the importance of ownership,
which may be derived from the Coase theorem (Coase 1960). If the distribution of
ownership rights generally does not matter for resource allocation in the absence of
transaction costs, why should the allocation of corporate ownership?  To what extent
are contracts really as incomplete as assumed in the incomplete contracts framework,
and is it possible to contract around the possible limitations of foundation ownership.
One could argue that the Coase theorem properly understood shifts the burden of
proof to the theorists who claim that ownership matters.  Are we really so sure that
economically insurmountable information asymmetries create large agency problems
in practice? Do companies really face important (wealth reducing) financial
constraints? What is to prevent them from contracting around the ownership barrier
using bank credits, securitization or joint ventures to finance projects that they want to
undertake? If markets are complete or at least well developed, ownership might be
less of a binding constraint.
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3.  Institutional context
Foundation ownership is found mainly in Northern Europe - Germany, Sweden,
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, where foundation-owned companies account
for a non-trivial share of the business sector. For example, during the preparation of
this study we found that industrial foundations own 1/6 of the market capitalization
quoted on Copenhagen Stock Exchange.   One plausible explanation is the relatively
high rates of taxation in these countries, particularly wealth taxes (including
inheritance and capital gains taxation) which were historically high, but have now
been reduced by tax reforms (Thomsen 1999). Owners that prefer to retain family
control of a company have avoided some of these taxes by donating their shares to a
foundation instead of bequeathing them to their descendants. In addition the
foundation structure is a way to avoid dilution of ownership by bequest to several
beneficiaries. Although a general charitable purpose is required by law  (in the sense
that the founder and her closest family cannot be beneficiaries) the foundation may
also to some extent distribute funds to more remote members of the founder’s family
(including her grown-up children and their descendants). The foundation may
therefore act as a trustee. But while taxation may partially explain why industrial
foundations are relatively common in Northern Europe, the foundations themselves
are currently taxed with normal company tax rates (with deduction for their charitable
donations), and there are no tax subsidies for the foundation-owned companies
(Thomsen 1999). This means that their performance is in principle comparable to that
of other companies.
Legally, an industrial foundation can be defined by an irreversible donation of a
company’s stock (or a majority of the voting rights) to a foundation, which is
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governed by a foundation board according to the foundation charter (Kronke 1982).
The decisive factor is a clear separation between the personal economic affairs of the
founder and those of  the foundation. The  separation effectively transforms the
foundation into a non-profit entity which as emphasized by Hansmann (1980, 1987)
may earn profits but cannot redistribute them, except in this case for charitable
purposes. The irreversibility is what distinguish foundations from US style family
trusts. Moreover, while running a company is considered to be an acceptable aim that
is consistent with a charitable intention, a foundation can only to a limited extent
redistribute income to the founder or his closest family. The foundation is an
independent, private (non-government) institution. It has no owners and no members.
Once created, however, foundations are in principle self-perpetuating bodies provided
that they are financially viable. In principle they will continue to carry out the will of
the founder in all eternity.
 Like other foundations the industrial foundation is formally governed by a charter
which defines its purpose and organization, including how the board is elected and
whether parts of its income should be used  for other kinds of charity than running a
company. For example, the charter may proscribe that certain worthy causes (like
research, art or charity) should be supported by revenues beyond what is considered
necessary to reinvest in the business.  The foundation charter may also  specify that
the foundation should act for the benefit the company, the employees or the national
interest. Moreover, the charter may oblige the foundation to maintain majority
ownership of the company.  Under the constraints set by the charter  (which are
subject to government approval and supervision) the board acts at its own discretion.
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If  the foundation is the sole owner (no minority shareholders) the company and
foundation board members may be identical and even (in a few cases) use the
foundation structure to conduct business without incorporating a separate company.
But if part of the company’s shares are held by other shareholders - e.g. if they are
listed on the stock exchange - the company will in principle act as any other joint
stock company. The company is legally responsible to (all of) its shareholders and at
an annual general meeting they will elect a board to represent their interests.
However, as a majority owner, the foundation possesses a controlling influence,
which it may (or may not) choose to exercise. Danish industrial foundations often
retain a voting majority by holding the shares with superior voting rights (A shares),
whereas they issue shares with reduced voting rights to the public (B-shares).
4. Data
This paper aims at examining the performance of foundation-owned companies using
market-based performance measures. The data consists of all companies listed
companies on Copenhagen Stock Exchange during 1996-1999. Firms that have not
been listed during the entire 4-year period are excluded together with mutual funds.
This leaves a sample of 171 firms, of which 20 are majority-controlled by an
industrial foundation. All observations are based on average values over the period.
A list of variables, descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are given in the
appendix. Financial information for each firm is based on the firm’s annual accounts.
Information about foundation ownership is also obtained from the annual accounts,
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which report indirect ownership and the number of votes controlled by each
foundation.
Stock market information is downloaded from the database BORSDATA located at
the Aarhus School of Business, Centre for analytic finance (www.caf.dk) which
contains a unique and extensive collection of stock market information of Danish
shares and bonds. Stock returns are continuously compounded on a daily basis
(arithmetic averages) and adjusted for stock splits as well as new emissions according
to the Danish Association of Financial Analysts (DAF).
We use four different performance measures in order to draw general inferences
between foundation ownership and firm performance.
The first performance measure is risk adjusted stock returns (α) measured by Jensen’s
alpha (Jensen 1968 and 1969). Jensen’s alpha is a differential performance index,
which measures the average return on a portfolio over and above that predicted by the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), given the portfolio’s beta and the average
market return.  This performance measure is widely used in financial economics. It
was originally designed to measure the performance of mutual funds since it explicitly
incorporates a firm’s systematic risk i.e. the risk that is not eliminated by holding a
diversified portfolio.
The mean excess return on firm (i) in our sample of companies is based on the
following expression:
))(()( ,,,, tftMiitfti rRErRE −+=− βα   (1)
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E(Ri,t) denotes expected return on firm i on day t, while rf,t  equals the risk free interest
rate on day t. The risk free interest rate (spot rate) is based on estimated daily Danish
zero coupon treasury bonds which is downloaded from the database BORSDATA.
E(RM,t) is equal to the expected return on the market portfolio on day t. This is equal
to the return on KAX CSE all Share Index. The parameters, αi   (Jensen’s alpha) and
βi for each firm are estimated by OLS. We use αi   as a measure of risk adjusted stock
performance.
In addition, we also measure the actual, unadjusted stock return at year t, Rt by the
following expression 1
1
−
+
=
−t
tt
t P
DPR , where Dt denotes the shares dividend payment
at year t and Pt the price at year t, respectively.
The third performance measure is Tobin’s Q which measures expected future
profitability due to valuable growth opportunities and/or a competitive advantage.
This article calculates the Q ratio as the market value of equity and book value of debt
divided by the book value of total assets (denoted the “simple Q” by Loderer and
Martin 1997), since  the Tobin’s Q measure of equity at replacement costs was not
available. Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that the correlation between the “simple Q”
and a measure of Q that attempts to use market values throughout is as high as 0.97.
The last performance measure is return on assets or ROA, which is the most common
measure of accounting profitability defined as net income plus interests before tax
divided by total book assets.
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Found is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if a foundation controls more
than fifty percent of the votes, otherwise it equals zero.
We also add some control variables.
When analysing stock returns we correct for two risk measures, which have now
become standard in the financial economics literature, firm size and the book-to-
market ratio. These measures were suggested by Fama and French (1992), who found
that they influence the cross sectional variation of stock returns.  They found a
negative effect of firm size (market value) and a positive effect of the book/market
ratio defined as book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
Presumably higher stock returns for small firms are necessary to compensate investors
for higher portfolio risks related to liquidity, information access and other factors.  To
avoid a definitional association between size and market based performance measures
we prefer to measure size as the natural logarithm of yearly sales. The positive
book/market effect may be attributable to risk related to financial distress. Firms
which the market judges to have poor prospects, signalled by a low stock price and
high ratios of book to market equity, have higher expected returns due to higher costs
of capital compared to firms with strong prospects.
In regressions on firm value (Q) and accounting returns (ROA) we include measures
of  the equity ratio (equity/assets), growth (of assets) and earnings variance (variance
of ROA). Both earnings variance and the equity/assets ratio are standard proxies for
financial risk (e.g. bankruptcy risk). The growth variable is intended to control for
differences in growth potential related to industry, life cycle and regulation.
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Furthermore we add dummy variables for industry using the official industry
classification by the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (www.cse.dk) during the period.
In order to avoid problems associated with heteroscedasticity that sometimes occur in
cross sectional regressions we use White’s (1980) estimates with consistent standard
errors. Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are given in the appendix.
In order to check the robustness of the results, all regression equations are re-
estimated, where we have excluded more extreme observations. Only one observation
is excluded when we use Jensens alpha (with an alpha value of 0,010).  Two
observations have been excluded in the equations where the dependent variable is
stock return (returns of 369 and 793 percent, respectively). Two observations with
ROA of 27 and 17,7 percent are also excluded. Tobin’s Q values larger than 6 were
omitted which resulted in the exclusion of two firms (with Q values of 16,37 and
14,70 respectively).  Robustness tests including extreme observations did not lead to
qualitatively different results.
5. Results
Tables 1-4 presents some estimations of the performance of foundation-owned
companies relative other ownership structures. We present estimations on alternative
performance measures both with and without relevant control variables.
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In table 1, foundation ownership is found to have no significant effect on risk adjusted
stock returns.  This holds true both in a simple regression (model 4) and when
controlling for size and book-to-market value effects, both of which are negative. The
negative size effect indicates (as expected) that portfolio risk decreases with firm size,
but the negative book-to-market ration is contrary to the results found by Fama and
French.  The reason may be that a low book value also signals (default) risk.
An alternative specifications using market value as a size variable did not make the
results conform to expectations. The size effect now became insignificant which
possibly reflects a definitional positive association between average market values
over a period and the stock returns which are highly correlated with increases in
market value. The industry effects were insignificant expect that banks earned larger-
than expected stock returns during the period.
On its own, the insignificant performance effect is consistent with market efficiency.
If stock markets are efficient and a (positive or negative) premium for foundation
ownership is already contained in the share price at the beginning of the period, this is
what we would expect to find.  However it is notable that the results are robust to
statistical control for a valuation-dependent measure like the book/market ratio.
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Table 1. Regression estimates of risk adjusted stock returns (Jensens alpha) as the
dependent variable with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (White 1980).
171 observations. The numbers in the parentheses are significance levels.
Independent variables          1                        2                       3                     4
Constant                              0,024                0,026                0,178             -0,006*
                                           (0,028)**          (0,074)             (0,154)            (0,000)
Found                                 -0,003               -0,006               -0007             -0,010
                                           (0,657)             (0,464)              (0,442)           (0,301)
Size                                     -0,002**           -0,002**          -0,002**
                                           (0,006)             (0,023)              (0,034)
Book/market                       -0,004**           -0,005**
                                            (0,023)            (0,026)
Bank                                    0,010**             0,014**             0,013**
                                            (0,039)            (0,001)              (0,001)
Trade                                  -0,001
                                            (0,989)
Industry                               -0,004
                                            (-0,435)
Insurance                              0,002
                                            (0,846)
Shipping                              -0,030
                                            (0,210)
Adj. R2                                  0,18                 0,13                  0,09                 0,02
** Significant at the 5 percent level
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Table 2. Regression estimates of stock returns as the dependent variable with
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (White 1980). 171 observations. The
numbers in the parentheses are significance levels.
Independent variables          1                  2                  3                  4                 5
Constant                              71,343          84,149         83,476        32,032**      66,231
                                            (0,075)         (0,060)        (0,077)        (0,002)        (0,113)
Found                                  -2,186          -2,869          -3,085         -5,910          -4,346
                                            (0,739)         (0,687)       (0,623)         (0,434)        (0,539)
Size                                     -3,848           -3,751         -3,682                              -3,321
                                           (0,140)          (0,131)        (0,175)                            (0,207)
Book/market                      -11,856**      -12,037**   -11,988**   -11,509**
                                            (0,029)         (0,022)        (0,026)        (0,027)
Bank                                    15,103**        1,119
                                            (0,028)         (0,844)
Trade                                   23,844
                                            (0,303)
Industry                               11,215
                                            (0,176)
Insurance                             18,892
                                            (0,073)
Shipping                              14,948
                                            (0,235)
Adj. R2                                    0,04             0,03             0,03            0,02             0,02
** Significant on a 5 percent level
23
Table 3. Regression estimates of Tobins Q as the dependent variable with
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (White 1980). 171 observations. The
numbers in the parentheses are significance levels.
Independent variables          1                2                 3                4                 5
Constant                               0,012          0,049        0,846**     1,068**       1,249**
                                            (0,987)       (0,950)      (0,000)       (0,000)       (0,000)
Found                                   1,422          1,588        1,635          1,618          1,666
                                            (0,083)       (0,077)      (0,076)       (0,079)        (0,077)
Size                                      0,068           0,056
                                            (0,169)        (0,271)
Equity ratio                          0,174           0,195         0,177         0,183
                                            (0,129)        (0,080)      (0,089)      (0,083)
Growth                                0,163            0,164         0,162
                                           (0,195)         (0,195)      (0,208)
Bank                                    -0,349
                                            (0,214)
Trade                                   -0,077
                                            (0,795)
Industry                               -0,014
                                            (0,960)
Insurance                             -0,481
                                            (0,147)
Shipping                               1,782
                                            (0,400)
Adj. R2                                    0,11             0,12             0,12            0,12             0,09
** Significant on a 5 percent level
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Table 4. Regression estimates of return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable
with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (White 1980). 171 observations.
The numbers in the parentheses are significance levels.
Independent variables          1                  2                  3                4               5
Constant                               4,697          7,706**       7,355**      6,491**    4,685**
                                            (0,214)       (0,000)         (0,000)       (0,000)      (0,000)
Found                                   1,002          1,247           1,512          1,122        1,594
                                            (0,490)       (0,362)         (0,273)       (0,401)     (0,221)
Size                                       0,155
                                             (0,559)
Equity ratio                          -0,869        -0,886          -0,907
                                             (0,091)       (0,072)        (0,076)
VarROA                               -0,006**     -0,006                          -0,006
                                             (0,047)        (0,054)                        (0,061)
Bank                                     -5,046**     -5,689**    -5,356**   -4,606**
                                             (0,001)        (0,000)       (0,000)      (0,000)
Trade                                     0,631
                                             (0,774)
Industry                                 0,978
                                             (0,542)
Insurance                              -5,638**       -5,847**    -5,501**  -4,796**
                                              (0,001)         (0,000)      (0,000)      (0,000)
Shipping                                -4,248**      -4,906**    -4,806**  -4,364**
                                              (0,022)         (0,000)       (0,000)     (0,000)
Adj. R2                                     0,19              0,21            0,16         0,16          0,02
** Significant on a 5 percent level
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In table 2 a similar result is found for total (unadjusted) stock returns (incl. dividends).
Foundation-owned companies have obtained slightly lower stock returns over the
period, but the effect is not statistically significant.  The size-effect is now also
insignificant, but the book to market effect remains significant and negative contrary
to expectation. As in table 2 the industry effects are insignificant (with the possible
exception of banks which earned higher returns than “other companies” (model 1),
but not above-average returns (model 2)).
Table 3 examines effects on firm value measured by Tobin’ s Q. Here foundation
ownership appears to increase firm value by 1.5 – a considerable effect given the
average Q-value of 1.4.  The effect is significant at the 10% level.  Firm size and
growth have no significant effect, but a higher equity ratio (lower leverage) has a
weakly significant positive effect indicating perhaps that firm value increases with
bankruptcy risk.
In principle, the higher Q-value for foundation-owned companies may reflect higher
expected profitability, but it may also be attributable to other factors.  Foundation-
owned companies may be particularly cautious in their choice of accounting
principles so that they tend to understate their equity. It is also possible that the equity
of the foundations (which is not included in the balance sheet of the companies that
they own) is correctly as a low cost source of capital and as an insurance against
bankruptcy and financial distress. They may also invest more in intangible firm
specific assets like research and development, reputation or implicit contacts with
employees  (an explanation which is consistent with the Hansmann/Glaeser/Shleifer
theory of non-profits). Ideally we would therefore have liked to control for variables
like research and adverting intensity but we did have access to these figures. Instead,
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we experimented with a dummy variable for firms in the pharmaceutical industry, but
this did not qualitatively affect the statistical results.
Table 4 presents estimates of effects on accounting profitability (return on total
assets). Foundation-owned companies are found to earn one percentage point more on
accounting assets, but the difference is clearly insignificant. The equity/assets effect is
negative (and weakly significant) and so is the effect of earnings volatility (Var
ROA).  The negative equity ratio effect makes sense as a trade off between risk and
return if financial risk increases with leverage and so is negatively correlated with the
equity ratios. But the negative earnings volatility effect does not conform to
expectation. A possible alternative explanation could be that profitable companies use
part of their surplus to stabilize profit rates.  The industry effects turn out to be highly
significant indicating that financial institutions (banks, insurance) and shipping have
much lower accounting returns than industrial and trading companies.
In conclusion, none of the 4 performance measures indicate that foundation-owned
companies have done significantly worse that other ownership categories over the
period.
To test the robustness of our findings we tried with a number of alternative model
specifications, but none of these changed the basic result. For example, we introduced
industry-dummies for pharmaceutical companies. We redid the regressions omitting
two particularly large shipping companies that are part of the same company group
(and have high Q-values). We replaced the book/market control variable by a more
familiar measure of financial risk (the debt/equity ratio). And we controlled for initial
rather than average Q- and book/market values in order to test for statistical bias and
selection effects (i..e. that the market value of foundation-owned companies is likely
be high ex ante).
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6. Discussion
This paper has found that foundation-owned companies do at least as well as other
companies in terms of stock performance, firm value and accounting profitability.
Could it be a coincidence? The small sample of 20 firms used in the present study is
sensitive to random effects even over a 4-year period. However, previous empirical
studies on other data sources (Thomsen 1996, 1999, Herrmann and Franke 2002) have
also failed to find a negative performance effect of foundation ownership.
Another possibility might be that agency problems are solved by alternative
mechanisms such as creditor monitoring, product market competition, monitoring by
minority investors or competitive markets for managerial labour. However, these
hypotheses are analysed and rejected by Thomsen (1999) who finds that foundation-
owned companies have low debt/equity ratios, high profit/sales ratios, high survival
rates and low replacement rates for top managers and that companies.
Other explanations are therefore called for. Could it be that the agency-theoretic
emphasis on high-powered profit incentives is inappropriate? If the supervisory
boards of foundation-owned companies are motivated by reputation, intrinsic
motivation and other factors, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems may be
no more serious than what is observed on the boards of other companies.
Alternatively, there may be compensating advantages to stable long-term ownership,
which makes foundation-ownership competitive. For example, myopic behaviour
related to takeover pressure (Stein 1989) may be less of a problem in foundation-
owned companies.
Or is it simply that ownership structure is endogenous (Demsetz 1983)? For example,
a foundation could decide to sell off their company or parts of it if it perceives that
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this maximises the expected survival chances of the company or other objectives that
the foundation may have. Several recent studies have found no significant
performance effect of ownership structure when accounting for endogeneity using
simultaneous models (Loderer and Martin 1997; Cho 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard
and Palia 1999, Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). And even if it is not there may be
ways of reaching efficient outcomes by means of alternative contracts (Coase 1960,
Fama and Jensen 1985).
 While we cannot answer these questions in the present paper, it seems clear that the
relative success of foundation-owned companies is inconsistent with the simple
agency-theoretic emphasis on incentives and risk aversion. The causes and effects of
ownership structure are more complex than that. Echoing Ronald Coase (1972) it is
premature to automatically attribute deviations from ideal markets to monopoly or
inefficiency (Coase 1972). A more promising perspective is to explore the efficiency
characteristics of these non-market institutions, especially when they emerge in
market economies.
This has important policy implications in the ongoing debate of whether policy
makers should promote the convergence of European corporate structures – such as
foundation ownership – to Anglo-American standards, which are currently considered
to be more attractive. For example the Bolkestein report (2002) has recently suggested
that the differential voting rights of dual class shares schemes, which several
industrial foundations use to maintain control, should be suspended in case a takeover
bid is supported by ¾ of the share capital. Our viewpoint is no, let alternative
institutional structures compete and let the markets decide. If they decide that strange
institutions like foundation ownership are viable, social welfare may even be served
by respecting that decision.
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Appendix
List of variables: All variables are based on four year averages if not stated otherwise:
- Tobins Q: Market value of equity and book value of debt divided by total book
assets. Market value equals share price times the number of outstanding shares.
All book values are obtained at the end of the year
- Jensens Alpha is obtained for each firm by regressing daily share return minus the
daily risk free interest rate against the return on KAX CSSE all Share Index minus
the risk free interest rate.
- Return equals the ratio of share price at the end of the year plus dividend per share
divided by share price at the beginning of the year minus 1. The series is corrected
for stock splits, share issues, warrants issues etc.
- ROA equals Net income plus interests before tax divided by total book assets the
end of the year
- VarROA is identical to the variance of the yearly ROA
- Found is a dummy that equals one if a foundation controls more than fifty percent
of the votes, otherwise it equals zero
- Size equals to the natural log of market value of equity
- Book/Market equals book value of equity divided by market value of equity
- Equity ratio book value of equity divided by total book assets
- Growth equals the book value of total assets in 1999 divided by total book value
in 1996
- Banks  The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange year 2001
- Trade The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange year 2001
- Industry The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange year 2001
- Insurrance The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange year 2001
- Shipping The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange year 2001
- Investment Associations. The official branch code at Copenhagen Stock Exchange
year 2001.
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Appendix. Descriptive statistics
Correlation matrix
ALPHA Q RETURN ROA FOUNDEQUITYRVARROA GROWTH SIZE BTM BANKS TRADE INDUST INSUR SHIP
ALPHA 1,00
Q 0,12 1,00
RETURN 0,10 0,07 1,00
ROA 0,06 0,14 0,00 1,00
FOUND -0,16 0,31 -0,03 0,09 1,00
EQUITYR 0,04 0,19 -0,03 -0,12 0,05 1,00
VARROA 0,02 0,09 0,05 -0,21 -0,05 0,06 1,00
GROWTH 0,10 0,08 0,16 0,00 -0,04 0,07 0,04 1,00
LNSIZE -0,12 0,04 -0,09 0,04 0,14 -0,31 -0,28 -0,04 1,00
BTM -0,19 #### -0,14 -0,18 0,03 0,00 -0,12 -0,17 -0,06 1,00
BANKS 0,25 #### -0,02 -0,31 -0,11 -0,31 -0,10 -0,04 0,22 0,06 1,00
TRADE 0,04 #### 0,09 0,09 -0,09 0,04 0,17 0,00 -0,13 #### -0,30 1,00
INDUST. -0,11 0,12 0,00 0,24 0,16 0,28 -0,02 0,08 -0,18 #### -0,51 -0,41 1,00
INSUR -0,03 #### -0,02 -0,07 -0,05 -0,07 -0,02 0,02 0,24 0,04 -0,08 -0,07 -0,11 1,00
SHIP -0,35 0,17 -0,04 -0,09 0,19 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,12 0,20 -0,13 -0,10 -0,17 -0,03 1,00
INVASS 0,06 #### -0,05 -0,04 -0,09 0,00 -0,02 -0,11 -0,05 0,11 -0,14 -0,12 -0,20 -0,03 -0,05
Variable:           Obs       Mean      Std Error     Minimum      Maximum
Q                   171      1.453        1.741        0.383        16.370
GROWTH              171      1.399        0.858        0.128        10.661
VARROA              171     41.070      239.119        0.000      2937.796
EQUITY RATIO        171      1.020        1.682        0.047        13.104
RETURN              171     19.413       68.685      -36.882       793.433
ALPHA               171     -0.007        0.0215      -0.216         0.036
FOUND               171      0.122        0.3291       0.000         1.000
LNSIZE              171     13.929        1.7763       9.298        20.157
BTM                 171      1.033        0.8462       0.041         7.376
ROA                 171      4.880        5.8383     -27.040        22.750
BANKS               171      0.269        0.4447       0.000         1.000
TRADE               171      0.192        0.3957       0.000         1.000
INDUSTRY            171      0.409        0.4931       0.000         1.000
INSUR               171      0.017        0.1316       0.000         1.000
SHIP                171      0.040        0.1987       0.000         1.000
INVASS              171      0.052        0.2239       0.000         1.000
